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ABSTRACT
As long duration exploration missions (LDEMs) become the norm for spaceflight,
it is important to understand the factors that may influence how astronaut crews and ground
control teams work together. Although there are numerous efforts underway to continue
to push boundaries in space exploration, much of the existing work to examine teamwork
is designed to primarily address intrateam issues, not considering how inter-team factors
may predict team and mission performance. Given the potential future challenges and
uncertainties of LDEMs, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) has
identified a need for risk-mitigating spaceflight multiteam system (SFMTS) interventions
designed to resolve or prevent inadequate cooperation, coordination, communication, and
psychosocial adaptation, both within and between component teams. This study serves to
begin to break apart the specifics of how shifting inter-team autonomy is exhibited within
teams (i.e., crew claiming, mission control granting) in space and what team boundary
work (i.e., buffering) looks like in SFMTSs. Regarding inter-team autonomy shifts, we saw
that the majority (65%) of the 100 critical incidents coded exhibited this shift. Further,
most of these autonomy shifts were triggered by the space crew claiming its autonomy
from Mission Control. Almost half (46%) of the critical incidents exhibited an inter-team
autonomy shift triggered by “crew claiming”. Additionally, our findings focused around
team boundary work showed that multiple types of team boundary work were often
exhibited per critical incident. Buffering and Reinforcement were identified as the top
team boundary work types, followed closely by Reinforcement and Spanning. The results
show that very rarely is only one type of team-boundary work shown when there is an inter-
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team autonomy shift. The current team boundary work patterns found indicate the types of
functional boundary work needed for inter-team autonomy shifts in complex spaceflight
multiteam systems. These patterns were derived using the critical incident method and are
descriptive of behaviors that could be used as the basis of team boundary and inter-team
autonomy shift training for SFMTSs in LDEM. Implications of the findings from this study
and future directions are further discussed.
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INTRODUCTION
As National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) prepares for Return to
the Moon 2024 (Gohd, 2019) and subsequent long duration exploration missions (LDEMs),
efforts will be heavily implemented via spaceflight multiteam systems (SFMTSs), made
up of multiple, interdependent component teams working towards mission success while
physically apart from one another (Mathieu, Marks, & Zaccaro, 2001). To further clarify,
multiteam systems (MTS) have been described as “two or more teams that interface
directly and interdependently in response to environmental contingencies toward the
accomplishment of collective goals” (Mathieu et al., 2001, p. 290). Multiteam contexts are
tasks that require a higher level of analysis than the individual and team, but a level lower
than the organization and possibly extending across boundaries of multiple organizations
(Mathieu et al., 2001). Tasks performed by MTSs create uniquely challenging situations as
they often require coordination of efforts from multiple component teams that are often
previously unacquainted. Further, MTSs often require a collective effort bringing together
multiple areas of expertise found in the individual teams to tackle challenges in new,
unconventional ways (Lanaj, Hollenbeck, Ilgen, Barnes, & Harmon, 2013; Marks &
Luvison, 2012).
The efforts of SFMTSs, when properly coordinated, can achieve unprecedented
advances in spaceflight, yet they are at an incredible risk for major collaboration
breakdowns (Vessey, 2014, p. 135-153). Significant challenges relevant for team risk
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include social isolation, physical confinement, communication delays between crew and
ground, as well as a long duration, and a high consequence environment. Each of these
conditions affect the coordination, cooperation and overall performance of the team. Teams
in space are isolated from Earth, and sometimes may also experience some limited
psychological isolation (Landon, Vessey, & Barrett, 2016). However,

real-time

communication technologies (e.g., communication loops with Mission Control Center
(MCC), Internet Protocol (IP) phone) and other video and instant messaging technologies
(e.g., email, video messaging, internet) ensure current space crews such as those on the
International Space Station (ISS) remain connected to colleagues, professional support, and
friends and family on Earth (Khasawneh, Rogers, Bertrand, Madathil, & Gramopadhye,
2019; Landon et al., 2016).
Thus far, space vehicles have been designed to be primarily controlled from the
ground making MCC the leaders of all spaceflight missions, whereby the crew acts solely
through the leadership direction of MCC (Landon et al., 2016; Rogers, Khasawneh,
Bertrand, & Madathil, 2017). This arrangement depends heavily on effective coordination
across the SFMTS, especially during emergency situations. While this structure has worked
thus far, in future LDEMs communication delays due to the distance of the spaceship as it
travels away from Earth, will eliminate real-time communication between crew and ground
teams (Mesmer-Magnus, Carter, Asencio, & DeChurch, 2016; Rogers, Khasawneh,
Bertrand, & Chalil Madathil, 2019). Such communication constraints will inevitably
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require greater spaceflight crew autonomy from MCC, however little is known about the
changing levels of autonomy and the impact of autonomy on the team over long duration.
In this vein, autonomy becomes a potential risk factor for the MTS. For the context of
SFMTSs, autonomy is defined as the “conditions, constraints, and limits that influence the
degree of discretion by the astronaut or crew over choices, actions, and support in
accordance with standard operating procedures” (Rubino & Keeton, 2010, pg. 20). SFMTS
autonomy increases will likely modify training needs and necessitate mission planning that
accounts for higher involvement from the crew, in terms of procedures, structure, and even
crew composition (Rubino & Keeton, 2010).
To date, there have been no studies of autonomous crews in spaceflight for long
duration missions specifically (Landon et al., 2016). However, a recent related study
involving ISS crew members explored the impact of communication delays of roughly one
hour with MCC on performance and well-being (Palinkas et al., 2013). In this study,
autonomy was positively associated with crew and team performance, as well as crew wellbeing. However, autonomy was not found to mediate the relationship between
communication delays and outcomes, suggesting communication delays and autonomy
have a unique influence on performance and health outcomes. Additionally, the Astronaut
Journals Project (Stuster, 2010) identified outside communications with MCC as the
second-most

stated

category,

suggesting

the

importance

of

well-established

communication systems in the SFMTS. For example, ISS members communicate daily
with personnel in MCC at the Johnson Space Center in Houston, Texas as well as with
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payload communicators (PAYCOMs) located at the Marshall Spaceflight Center in
Huntsville, Alabama.
The current teaming and communication challenges experienced in SFMTSs are
not caused directly by communication system issues, but rather by interpersonal
frustrations between the parties communicating with each other. It is important to
acknowledge that LDEMs will lack the ability of instant communication between ground
and space crew, thus possibly complicating the interpersonal frustrations even more.
Moreover, it is likely that the intricacy of future LDEMs will require increased crew
discretion, less troublesome procedures, and general flexibility to perform tasks (Krikalev,
Kalery, & Sorokin, 2010). These would grant the astronaut crew more autonomy from
MCC, but with this freedom comes an increased responsibility and self-reliability for
dealing with not only day-to-day tasks but also emergency situations that may come up.
Thus, communication, goal, and leadership structures will probably need to shift, resulting
in successive changes in how these MTSs and their component teams will work together
(Zaccaro, Marks, & DeChurch, 2012).
Given these changes, there is a need to understand how the different component
teams must be prepared in terms of having the right attitudes, behaviors, and cognitions in
place - at both the team and system levels - in order to be prepared for such autonomy
shifts. We must focus on understanding the effects not only on the crew but on the system
in order to develop appropriate countermeasures. Therefore, this research effort seeks to
advance our understanding of autonomy shifts and boundary spanning processes in space
in order to provide practicable countermeasures NASA can take in preparation for LDEMs.
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The study of SFMTS in LDEMs is challenging at best due to the nature of such
teams and the relative frequency with which such teams exist. Therefore, this study
employs historiometry - a “collection of methods in which archival data concerning historic
individuals and events are subjected to quantitative analyses in order to test nomothetic
hypotheses about human thought, feeling, and action” (Simonton, 1998, p. 269). MTSs are
particularly advantageous to explore with historiometry, as they are often well-documented
as a source of success or failure in complex events (e.g., DeChurch, Burke, Shuffler, Lyons,
Doty, & Salas, 2011). Specifically, this study seeks to utilize this approach to abductively
uncover thematic patterns in prior SFMTS critical incidents that outline when and how
autonomy shifts are likely to occur for SFMTSs and inter-team boundary spanning
processes that are critical for responding effectively as a system when autonomy shifts
occur.
The Role of Multiteam Systems in Spaceflight
For the purpose of this work, it is important to ensure clarity around MTSs in
spaceflight. The SFMTS is comprised of multiple connections beyond the simple
crew/ground MTS, including a network of Mission Control teams within teams, and
extending across multiple agencies (e.g., NASA, International Space Agencies, ESA) and
specializations (e.g., astronauts, flight controllers, engineers). For example, the
International Space Station can be thought of as a long duration MTS, whereby mission
controls for different international agencies (e.g., NASA, Russian Federal Space Agency)
must work together to ensure the crew is supported during missions. In addition to
coordinating with their crew members on the ISS, the mission control centers must also
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coordinate with one another, and may have additional component teams that must
coordinate as MTSs to handle issues or needs as they arise. Another example of a MTS
operating in spaceflight could be a launch MTS, whereby different component teams are
responsible for planning and preparing the crew and space vehicle for launch. This can
involve engineering teams for the vehicle, psychological and health support teams for the
crew, and a leadership team for the actual lead up to countdown and launch.
Further, based on interviews with NASA personnel conducted by various
researchers (e.g., Burke & Feitosa, 2015; DeChurch & Mesmer-Magnus, 2015; Shuffler,
Jiménez-Rodríguez, & Kramer, 2015), there are four types of SFMTSs which represent the
structural features likely to play key roles in influencing relational states within and across
teams (depicted in Figure 1). These MTS types vary in terms of the degree to which
differences in disciplines, shared context, uncertainty and/or culture will shape team and
interteam relations. In this vein, one can see how space crew isolation from the SFMTS
has several implications on team performance.
To further understand the challenges faced by SFMTSs, it is important to mention
that previous astronauts have noted systematic issues in regards to the ground and crew
relations stating “I continue to be amazed by the degree to which the ground has gotten
into the habit of taking action and not informing the crew”, “I still get frustrated by the
degree to which we get left out of the loop. This has been a perpetual problem in the ISS
crew world”, and “the ground too often fails to consider the crew when making decisions
and taking action (Stuster, 2010, p. 31).” This type of divide between crewmember and
ground will be particularly challenging for LDEMs whereby immediate and frequent
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communication will no longer be an option. Despite the previous complaints regarding
ground and crew relations, there is still a deep gratitude and connection between these
component teams, and it would be irresponsible to leave out comments regarding this
effect. Previous astronauts have noted their appreciation for MCC by stating “I am surely
glad the ground is watching our backs. That really makes me feel better (Struster, 2010, p.
18)”. Thus, we can see that the spaceflight MTS is a complex system that requires a multifaceted approach to understanding the many factors that influence it. We must
acknowledge that the heavy dependency from crews on MCC won’t be possible during
LDEMs, as ground will not be able to provide immediate assistance. Therefore, the
extended communication delays will necessitate the need for positive system relations
between crew and ground prior to space flight and the capacity to manage autonomy shifts
without negatively impacting team performance.

Figure 1. Four types of SFMTSs (Shuffler et al., 2015).
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Autonomy Shifts & Communication Delays in LDEM SFMTSs
Communication is one of the most vital aspects to interactions among individuals,
teams, and MTSs. A literature review by Shuffler, Jiménez-Rodriguez, and Kramer (2015)
on MTSs points to communication as being particularly critical to MTS effectiveness. In
this review, communication was shown as a construct that has received significant
empirical/theoretical attention in being an important inter-& intra-team mediator for
functional/dysfunctional behavior processes in MTSs (see Figure 2). Further, an
operational assessment previously conducted by Shuffler and colleagues (2015) notes
interviewees discussed the importance of inter and intra-team communication, especially
regarding the anticipated communication delays. Interviewees noted, “we expect there to
be a greater number of disconnects and misunderstandings between ground and crew”.
LDEMs will experience greater delays than ever before in communication, demanding
increased autonomy for the astronaut crew that may have profound unprecedented effects
on the MTS performance.
Indeed, the anticipated autonomy shifts will have a profound effect on multiple
aspects of the team including managing day-to-day activities, such as making decisions or
solving various problems that may arise (Khasawneh, Ponathil, Firat Ozkan, & Chalil
Madathil, 2018; Leach, Wall, Rogelberg, & Jackson, 2005). Increases in autonomy have
shown to have positive effects, having an impact on multiple outcomes such as improved
performance and satisfaction (Thompson & Prottas, 2006; Leach, et al, 2005). Thus, we
can expect benefits in LDEM MTSs due to the anticipated autonomy shifts. For example,
the flexibility and autonomy the astronaut crew will be given is something that has been
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missing in current missions and a factor in causing annoyance/problems between space
crews and ground.

Figure 2. Summary of multiteam systems research framework.
Note: Bold items represent constructs with significant empirical & theoretical attention,
while italicized are constructs in need of future research/theory (Shuffler, et al., 2015).
Stuster (2010) noted that the space crew is aware that good relations with ground
personnel can contribute to effective task performance, but this has led to a tradition called
“praise inflation”, in which the spaceflight crew partakes in giving out profuse
complements, even when not deserved, and a general avoidance of criticizing the ground
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personnel for deficiencies, real and perceived. Further, it seems that at least a portion of
the ground personnel are more sensitive to certain remarks than the crew in space, a
condition known to cause hypersensitivity and exaggeration of trivial issues. Thus, rather
than facilitating the relationships between ground and on-orbit personnel, praise inflation
and hypersensitivity are a source of annoyance to most crew and ground members.
Further, while mission success and performance is always the first priority for
spaceflight missions, it is just as important, especially in LDEMs, to consider how
increases in autonomy influence intermediate outcomes, such as team cohesion (Man &
Lam, 2003), motivation (Langfred & Moye, 2004; Spector, 1986) and inter-team trust
(Langfred, 2005). LDEMs involve many unique stressors due to the nature of spaceflight
(Vessey, 2014), thus increases in team autonomy in these difficult situations may
subsequently reduce the stress of the situation. Karasek (1979, 1998) suggests that stress
increases when demands are high, as is particularly accurate in LDEMs, and when there is
little control or autonomy over the situation. In this vein, one method for reducing high
levels of stress experienced in LDEMs would be to increase the autonomy of the
component teams, particularly of the spaceflight crew itself.
While research shows hopeful promise in the benefits autonomy can bring to
performance, we must remember that an autonomous spaceflight crew has not been known
to exist thus far. Therefore, autonomy shifts pose novel risks for MTSs that should be
carefully considered. It has been established that due to the distance from Earth on LDEMs,
communication delays between ground and crew are expected, thereby reducing the level
of interdependence between teams in the MTS and increasing the level of autonomy teams
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will experience. Vessey (2014) suggested that communication delays will hinder effective
coordination between component teams, reducing the quality of teamwork between teams
and restricting the ability of the MTS to successfully complete their mission. Further, these
delays in communication will also limit the amount of support (e.g. informational, social)
ground control can provide to the spaceflight crew (Kanas et al., 2007) during routine tasks
but also novel or emergency tasks alike. This will force the spaceflight crew to adapt to the
limited inter-team communication and the shifting inter-team autonomy.
With this in mind, the current research seeks to uncover thematic patterns of
autonomous crew behavior throughout critical incidents in prior SFMTs to further our
understanding of what situations/contexts look like that either required an autonomous shift
in the crew (e.g., communication issues) or in which the crew simply engaged in
autonomous behavior and what the outcomes were. Thus, this research seeks to address the
following research questions:
RQ 1: How is shifting inter-team autonomy exhibited within the space crew in
SFMTSs?
Team Boundary Work
It is not enough to solely uncover the context and outcomes related to inter-team
autonomy shifts; instead it is necessary to uncover the behaviors and processes enacted
during inter-team autonomy shifts. Recently, research has started to acknowledge team
boundary work as an important component for SFMTS effectiveness (Pendergraft, Carter,
Tseng, Landon, Slack, & Shuffler, 2019). Team boundary work has been defined by Faraj
and Yan (2009) as the activities that a team engages in to establish and maintain boundaries
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that are open enough to allow information and resources in, yet established enough to avoid
uncertainty about who is on the team and who is held accountable for its collective
outcomes.
Accordingly, team boundary work can be thought of as work done by members of
the component team that involves acquiring information and resources while also
managing relationships with external stakeholders and protecting internal team resources
(e.g., team members’ time and energy) from competing demands (Reagans & Zuckerman,
2001). To further clarify this concept, research regarding boundary spanning has identified
three distinct types of boundary work: boundary spanning, boundary buffering, and
boundary reinforcement (Davison & Hollenbeck, 2012; Faraj & Yan, 2009). The following
section summarizes each type of boundary work and articulates the research questions I
seek to answer specifically in terms of understanding boundary work in SFMTS.
Boundary Spanning
Boundary spanning has been defined as a strategy of engagement, in which a focal
team undertakes actions to reach out into its environment in order to acquire important
resources and support. Druskat and Wheeler (2003) reported that undertaking boundary
spanning actions strongly affects team performance. Through boundary spanning, teams
reach out to secure necessary resources and support in order to accomplish the team goal,
while also developing relationships with stakeholders and promoting the team’s work.
Boundary spanning is an important activity that helps the team accomplish its objectives,
thereby contributing to MTS performance as a whole (Davison & Hollenbeck, 2012;
Agnisarman, Khasawneh, Ponathil, Lopes, & Madathil, 2018).
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Boundary Buffering
Unlike boundary spanning, boundary buffering is a strategy of disengagement, in
which a team closes itself off from the environment. A team buffers in order to protect
itself from external disturbances and uncertainties, consequently enhancing the possibility
of successful performance within (Lynn, 2005). Further, researchers have suggested that
buffering may be undertaken either in response to or in anticipation of disruptive factors
within the environment. It is important to note that evidence of buffering has shown to
involve both formal strategies and procedures as well as informal codes and norms for
deflecting these external disturbances and outside pressure or interference within the
environment (Faraj & Yan, 2009). Boundary buffering strengthens the team’s boundaries
against external disturbances and protects its members by creating an internal atmosphere
free from unnecessary disruptive factors, thereby contributing to team performance.
Boundary Reinforcement
Boundary reinforcement is a less studied type of boundary work in comparison to
buffering and spanning. This type of boundary work refers to the ways in which a team
internally sets and reclaims its boundaries by increasing member awareness of boundaries
and enhancing team identity. Thus, boundary reinforcement is inward-facing work that is
focused on factors internal to the team. Through boundary reinforcement, teams can
maintain members focused on carrying out the team’s task, possibly increasing team
identification and commitment and enhancing individual and collective learning and
creativity (Lovelace, Shapiro, & Weingart, 2001), thus contributing to team performance.
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Boundary Work in LDEM SFMTSs
Due to the unique nature of LDEMs, it is important to take into account
environmental factors that may influence team boundary work. Previous research suggests
that team boundary work may be context dependent and task specific (Ancona & Caldwell,
1990). For instance, a team in an uncertain environment may engage in boundary buffering
and reinforcement more heavily than it engages in spanning in order to reduce
environmental demands impending performance (Faraj & Yan, 2009). LDEMs in space
rely on the coordinated efforts of the SFMTS that crosses organizational, geographic,
cultural and temporal boundaries (Anania et al., 2017). Thus, as team boundary work can
be influenced by the situation and context a team operates in and as boundary work
processes can be developed and reinforced prior to and during SFMTS missions, this study
seeks to answer the following research questions:
RQ2: When faced with shifting inter-team autonomy, what team boundary work
types (e.g., spanning, buffering, reinforcement) have been utilized, and what is their impact
on SFMTS outcomes?
RQ3: When faced with shifting inter-team autonomy, how are SFMTSs boundary
work types (e.g., spanning, buffering, reinforcement) implemented?
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METHOD
Historiometry
Given the challenges that LDEMs and spaceflight contexts pose in terms of
securing adequate data collection opportunities, the present research study utilizes
historiometric analysis (HMA) to investigate the constructs of interest using archival
sources, in line with others who have studied these contexts (DeChurch et al., 2011). The
HMA method has been present in the social sciences for more than a century and is
generally defined as the systematic analysis of the content of past events through review
and coding of previously published media documenting historical events and persons, such
as biographies, periodicals, and written histories (Crayne & Hunter, 2018). This method is
particularly useful for organizational sciences, because it allows researchers to convert
historical content into numerical data that may be further analyzed statistically.
Crayne and Hunter (2018) argue that the usefulness of HMA is further amplified
when unique or rare data samples, context and situational specifics, and/or longitudinal
data are examined--all of which is the case for SFMTSs. Additionally, in a recent study
on team leadership using HMA, Burke, Shuffler and Wiese (2018) note that historiometry
is especially useful when exploring relatively new constructs which have not been
thoroughly examined or understood (such as LDEMs), and also suggest that HMA benefits
from the “contextual richness of the data and the corresponding external validity” (p. 8).
Specifically, recent studies have relied on inductive, qualitative methods to review topics
of group-level impacts on leadership, MTSs, team leadership, and team adaptation
(Mumford et al., 2008; DeChurch et al., 2011; Randall, Resick, & DeChurch, 2011; Burke
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et al., 2018). Qualitative methods that are inductive in their approach begin with data
instead of hypotheses and involve the constant comparison of results to new data in order
to refine ideas before an explanatory theory is developed (Brown & Glaser, 1978). Thus,
this research utilized this approach and leveraged actual historical data from prior SFMTS
critical incidents to successfully provide translatable, actionable results needed for
developing the risk-mitigating interventions NASA desires.
Critical Incident Technique
Modeling upon similar historiometric studies of MTSs (e.g., DeChurch, et al.,
2011), the present study also employs the critical incident (CI) technique in order to ensure
systematic extraction of relevant information from the archival data sources. The CI
technique is defined as “a method for obtaining specific, behaviorally focused descriptions
of work or other activities” (Bownas & Bernardin, 1988, p. 1120). SFMTS CIs are specific
events that have occurred in prior SFMTSs and are focused on observable behaviors,
contain descriptive information about the situational context, and conclude with outcomes
clearly tied to behaviors described in the SFMTS incident. Following the extraction of
critical incidents, subject-matter experts (SMEs) sort CIs into emergent set of themes and
then confer to reach a consensus on themes identified, and finally an additional set of raters
re-categorizes the same CIs to identify the percentage of agreement between the raters and
evaluate viability of the thematic schemas and categories (DeChurch, et al, 2011).
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PROCEDURE
In a recent review, Crayne and Hunter (2018) outline the details of the HMA
process, broken down into key steps and sub-step actions that should be taken (see
Appendix A for steps as detailed by Crayne and Hunter (2018)). These were followed as
summarized below.
Historiometric Analysis
Definition of Constructs and Research Questions
The constructs and research questions were defined as outlined and discussed
above. This research seeks to identify thematic patterns in crew autonomy behaviors and
boundary spanning work in previous SFMTSs. Specifically, the constructs of focus are in
relation to the boundary work displayed in each critical incident extracted. That is, this
research is not simply looking at thematic behavioral patterns in which autonomy is
displayed in the SFMTSs, but rather, it is specifically looking at the situation or context
that initiated inter-team autonomy shifts, the type of boundary work (boundary spanning,
boundary buffering, and/or boundary reinforcement) the team performs during a critical
incident and the outcomes associated with such.
Investigative Piloting
A preliminary list of sources was created, drawing on recommendations from
NASA subject matter experts (SMEs) as well as the resources listed on the official
NASA.gov website. These identified sources varied in their format and intended audience
and included government reports, mission logs from websites maintained by NASA, and
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interviews from NASA’s oral history projects. Investigative piloting was conducted by
evaluating sources based on the presence or absence of discrete episodes involving
SFMTSs and using them to guide the identification of additional sources. Where episodes
that involved descriptions of SFMTS collaboration were found, further searches were
conducted as needed to uncover additional contextual documentation pertaining to the
event. This stage of investigative piloting also served to inform decisions on how this
information might be coded to determine the types of boundary work teams may engage in
during autonomy shifts.
Decision of Data Structure
A format for gathering critical incidents was chosen (see Appendix B). This format
follows the guidelines set forth for critical incidents by Flanagan (1954) by having critical
incidents include context, content, and consequences related to the phenomena of interest.
However, this format was tailored to the specific needs of this study such that each critical
incident includes the following components: spaceflight mission, relevant contextual
information; a description of the event/trigger initiating the critical incident; a description
of communication between ground and space crew or a description of autonomy shifts
during the critical incident (actions taken by crew or ground); a description of the outcomes
of the team’s actions; a summary of the critical incident; and a list of specific sources used
to draft it.
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Prototyping and Codebook Drafting
The coding of the type of boundary work and situations/contexts leading to interteam autonomy shifts was primarily driven by an abductive approach. A codebook was
developed for the delineation of boundary work types. This codebook was based on the
work done by Faraj and Yan (2009) to delineate boundary work types and examples of
them (please see Appendix C). The boundary work types were updated as definitions were
modified for the multi-team spaceflight context (see Appendix E). Further, a codebook for
inter-team autonomy shift trigger types was also developed (please see Appendix D).
Additionally, a prototype of a critical incident was developed in order to be used for
training.
Data Sources and Collection Refinement
The sources from which data was collected have been finalized to include published
and publicly available work detailing descriptions of SFMTS. A preliminary search for
documents yielded a total of 108 initial sources (see Table 1). The criteria for choosing
these sources followed recommendations by Parry, Mumford, Bower and Watts (2014).
Table 1. Summary of resources included for SFMTS historiometric analysis
Source Type

Count

Nasa Oral Histories

30

Official NASA or government reports

11

New articles, NASA articles, and mission archives

26

Other NASA documents

13
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Over 200 critical incidents were pulled from the source material. A summary table
is provided below with the total number of incidents pulled detailing the number of critical
incidents per mission (Table 2). Of those 254 critical incidents, 100 were selected by the
author for use in the current historiometric analysis based on appropriate content such as
in-flight or in-space context, as opposed to critical incidents describing incidents prior to
or post-flight. Table 3 shows the 100 incidents by spaceflight mission used for
historiometric analysis with their respective outcomes.
Table 2. Count of overall critical incidents by spaceflight mission name
Mission Name

Grand Total

Apollo Missions

121

Gemini Missions

96

Mercury-Atlas Missions

18

Shuttle-MIR Missions

18

Skylab Missions

1

Total

254
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Table 3. Count of critical incidents by spaceflight mission name used for current
historiometric analysis
Count of CIs per Outcome
Mission Name

Successful

Unsuccessful

Grand Total

Apollo 10

26

2

28

Apollo 12

9

1

10

Apollo 16

12

1

13

Apollo 16

1

-

1

Apollo 17

3

-

3

Apollo 8

6

-

6

Apollo 9

3

-

3

Gemini 10

6

-

6

Gemini 11

4

-

4

Gemini 12

4

1

5

Gemini 5

4

2

6

Gemini 8

4

Gemini 9

-

2

2

Mercury-Atlas 7

-

1

1

Mercury-Atlas 9

3

-

3

Shuttle-mir mission STS-60

1

-

1

Shuttle-mir Mission sts-86

3

-

3

Skylab 4

1

-

1

90

10

100

Grand Total

4

Coder Training
Coders included a total of eleven subject matter experts (SMEs), arranged into two
sets: one set (six SMEs) extracted critical incidents from the source material (extraction
team) and a second set (five SMEs) was responsible for the actual coding of the extracted
critical incidents (coding team). The extraction team consisted of six research assistants,
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all of whom were undergraduate psychology students trained on teaming/MTS research
and familiarized with the goals and objectives of the research.
Critical Incident Extraction
The extraction team was thoroughly trained on the critical incident technique, in
terms of the specific format developed and used for this study. This training consisted of
learning about the critical incident technique as well as how to apply it within the context
of this study, in terms of identifying critical incidents that describe cases of 1) autonomy
shifts and 2) inter-team boundary work. Members of the extraction team were involved in
practice rounds where they each assembled sets of critical incidents and received iterative
feedback as to the quality of the incident pulled. This process continued until the lead
research (author) was satisfied with the quality of the extracted incidents, in that all
extracted incidents from training materials contained the needed elements in the right
amount of detail and were being pulled in a similar manner across the individual coders.
Critical Incident Thematic Coding
Following the appropriate steps in the critical incident techniques, a group of three
SMEs individually sorted the CIs into a set of emergent themes. In order to reduce rater
bias, the group of SMEs performing the coding of CIs was distinct from the group
extracting the CIs. Once individual coding was completed, consensus around themes was
determined. SMEs consulted with each other until full consensus was reached regarding
the identified themes.
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The training of the coding team involved a slightly different process than that of
the extraction team. These three coders were selected as they each have relatively extensive
experience in coding of teamwork behaviors across several similar contexts. Furthermore,
they had a thorough understanding of teamwork, MTSs, and boundary work processes.
This combined with the emergent nature of the coding led to the members of the coding
team to not require formal training. Instead, they were guided by their prior knowledge in
the area, as well as the use of the codebook created discussed above (see Appendix C, D &
E).
Retranslation of Critical Incidents into Thematic Coding Categories
Finally, a different group of two SMEs individually sorted the same CIs. The
purpose of this final group of raters was to retranslate the CIs in order to identify inter-rater
reliability and evaluate the viability of themes identified. SMEs consulted with each other
until full consensus was reached regarding the identified themes.
Protocol Execution and Managing Coder Fatigue
Execution began with the pulling of critical incidents from the source material by
the trained coders. Each critical incident was built from the chosen material by
paraphrasing and creating summaries of the events and behaviors displayed by the
spaceflight team. After each critical incident was pulled from the source material, it went
through a quality control review by the author to ensure all relevant information was pulled
from the original source material. As previously mentioned, 100 critical incidents were
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chosen to go through the coding exercise. These incidents were chosen by the author as
appropriate critical incidents for coding team boundary work within SFMTSs.
The critical incidents were then used by coders to identify the boundary work type
as either team boundary spanning work, team boundary buffering work, or team boundary
reinforcement work and to specify the situation/context of each CI, implementation
processes of boundary work, and outcome associated with each CI. First round and second
round (back-translation) coders went through critical incidents by mission. That is, coders
coded all critical incidents for a single spaceflight mission at a time. This served to ensure
that coders had the maximum available context when coding each critical incident, as well
as minimized cognitive load and coder fatigue. At the conclusion of coding, the coding
team met for consensus meetings to resolve any discrepancies in coding.
Data Analysis Approach
To examine Research Question 1, the coding of how shifting inter-team autonomy
was exhibited for each CI was examined to determine the factors that lead to shifting interteam autonomy in SFMTSs. To analyze this data, three main factors that we believed were
three main possible ways for shifting inter-team autonomy to be exhibited were created as
coding options. These three factors were Crew Claiming, MCC Granting, and
Environmental Factors – please see Appendix C for definitions. After being coded the
themes were ranked to provide further insights into factors which most commonly lead to
inter-team autonomy shifts. The same process was executed to examine Research
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Questions 2 and 3 focusing on the specific objective of each research question. Research
Question 2 examined the type(s) of team boundary work exhibited in the presence of interteam autonomy shifts with their respective outcomes, and Research Question 3 took a more
in depth-look at how these team boundary work types were put in place to identify if there
was a specific order to them. These were the recommended and most appropriate analyses
for this type of work, as similar processes have previously been implemented in similar
studies (e.g., DeChurch et al., 2011; Pendergraft et al., 2019).
To conduct these analyses, this study utilized the definitions of team boundary work
types provided by Faraj and Yan (2009) as a basis, but modifications to the definitions
were made due to the unique environment SFMTSs are in. For example, team boundary
buffering for this study was defined as the disengagement of one team from the MTS or its
environment, similarly to how Farj and Yan (2009) defined it. However, we went one step
further to specifically identify team boundary buffering as any critical incident that
involved the space crew deliberately not reaching out to MCC. The difference here is that
in a more common environment, a team not reaching out to another for help may not
necessarily indicate buffering. However, because protocol suggests the space crew reach
out to MCC when any issues arise, not reaching out to MCC during an incident was
considered buffering boundary work. Further modifications and additions were made to
the team boundary work types (please see appendix D and E).
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RESULTS
Inter-team Autonomy Shifts
RQ1: How is shifting inter-team autonomy exhibited within the space crew in SFMTSs?
The results of the analyses depicted within the methods section yielded several
interesting findings. One of the primary questions of interest was focused on identifying
the way in which inter-team autonomy shifts took place by the space crew within SFMTSs.
In this vein, we focused on three primary ways in which autonomy may be triggered: Crew
Claiming, MCC Granting and Environmental Factors.
Results of the thematic analysis indicated all three triggers played a factor in the
way inter-team autonomy shifts were seen within the SFMTSs, specifically focused on an
autonomous space crew. More than half (65%) of the 100 critical incidents coded
demonstrated an inter-team autonomy shift (see Table 4). Not surprisingly, since most
space vehicles have been designed to be primarily controlled from the ground making MCC
the leaders of all spaceflight missions (Landon et al., 2016) our results showed that MCC
Granting was the lowest autonomy shift trigger. Crew Claiming was the highest trigger for
inter-team autonomy shifts showing an autonomous space crew within the SFMTS.
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Table 4. Percentage (%) type of trigger by observed inter-team autonomy shift in space
crew
Type of Team
Autonomy Shift
Trigger (%)

Inter-Team Autonomy Shift? (%)
No

Grand Total (%)

Yes

Crew Claiming

-

46

46

MCC Granting

1

21

22

5

5

Environmental Factors
No Shift

27

-

27

Grand Total (%)

28

72

100

Team Boundary Work Patterns
RQ2: When faced with shifting inter-team autonomy, what team boundary work types
have been utilized, and what is their impact on SFMTS outcomes?
A second area of interest pertained to the type of team boundary work exhibited
within the SFMTS when an autonomy shift takes place, and the respective outcomes.
Findings show that multiple types of team boundary work were often exhibited per critical
incident. Due to the exploratory nature of this study, coders were not limited to choosing
solely one type of team boundary work, thus the results show different emerging types of
team boundary work exhibited during inter-team autonomy shifts. It is important to note
that during the analysis, critical incidents were coded for boundary-work type even if they
did not exhibit an autonomy-shift in order to better understand team boundary work in
SFMTSs (table 5). However, the focus of RQ2 was on identifying themes or patterns in
team boundary work type when an inter-team autonomy shift was exhibited. Buffering and
Reinforcement were identified as the top team boundary work types, followed closely by
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Reinforcement & Spanning. The results show that very rarely is only one type of teamboundary work shown when there is an inter-team autonomy shift (see table 6).
Table 5. Count of team boundary work types by witnessed autonomy in space crews
Inter-Team Autonomy Shift?
Boundary-work Type

No

Yes

Grand Total

All 3

-

13

13

Buffering

-

2

2

Buffering
Reinforcement

-

24

24

Reinforcement

2

3

5

Reinforcement, Spanning

2

22

24

31

-

31

-

1

1

35

65

100

Spanning
Spanning, Buffering,
Grand Total

Table 6. Top three team boundary work types for inter-team autonomy shifts within
SFMTSs.
Team boundary work
type(s)

Rank
order

% of critical
incidents supporting
rank (%)

Buffering &
Reinforcement

1

37

Reinforcement &
Spanning

2

34

Buffering, Reinforcement
& Spanning

3

20

28

Table 7. Ranked team boundary work type for CI exhibiting inter-team autonomy shifts
per outcome
Boundary Work Type

Outcome of CI with Inter-team
autonomy shift
Successful (%)

Total (%)

Unsuccessful (%)

Buffering & Reinforcement

33.33

-

33.33

Reinforcement & Spanning

29.17

1.39

30.56

All 3 - Buffering, Reinforcement &
Spanning

13.89

4.17

18.06

Spanning

8.33

1.39

9.72

Reinforcement

2.78

1.39

4.17

Buffering

2.78

-

2.78

-

1.39

1.39

90.28

9.72

100

Spanning & Buffering
Total % of inter-team autonomy
shifts (%)

In addition, when looking at the outcomes of the coded critical incidents the results
showed that most incidents which exhibited inter-team autonomy shifts ended in a
successful outcome, with buffering and reinforcement together being the highest teamboundary work types to end in successful outcomes (see table 7). This finding is addressed
further in the discussion portion.
Team Boundary Work Processes
RQ3: When faced with shifting inter-team autonomy, how are SFMTSs boundary work
types (e.g., spanning, buffering, reinforcement) implemented?
Further, investigating the structural process of team boundary work when interteam autonomy shifts were exhibited was the focus of Research Question 3. The analysis
showed that when buffering and reinforcement took place within a single incident, they all

29

started with buffering followed by reinforcement making up 33% of critical incidents
exhibiting inter-team autonomy shifts. All the critical incidents that exhibited buffering
and reinforcement within one incident were successful, leading us to see these boundary
work types together as the most effective in terms of success. Furthermore, reinforcement
and spanning were the second highest boundary work types exhibited within a single
critical incident making up almost 31% of the inter-team autonomy shift critical incidents.
There were four different ways these boundary work types were implemented regarding
the boundary-work process, that is we identified four different ways of the order in which
reinforcement and spanning were exhibited. Table 8 shows these findings in more detail.
Lastly, the third highest types of boundary work exhibited within one critical incident was
made up of all three types of team boundary work: buffering, reinforcement and spanning.
Cis that exhibited all three types of team boundary work made up 18% of the critical
incidents exhibiting inter-team autonomy shifts. It was in these scenarios where we saw
the highest number of unsuccessful CIs making up 4% of the critical incidents coded for
inter-team autonomy shifts. This finding is interesting as it begins to point out that perhaps
when all three team boundary work types are exhibited there is too much chaos or
disturbance, leading to unsuccessful management of issues by the multiteam system.
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Table 8. Top 3 boundary work types with boundary work processes and outcomes
Team boundary
work type(s) for
coded interteam autonomy Boundary Work Process
shift(s) CIs
Buffering &
Reinforcement

Outcome
Successful
(%)

Buffering --> Reinforcement

33.33

Total (%)

Unsuccessful
(%)

Total
(%)

-

33.33
Reinforcement --> Spanning

9.72

Reinforcement --> Spanning -->
Reinforcement

2.78

33.33
33.33

1.39

-

11.11
2.78

Spanning --> Reinforcement
Reinforcement &
Spanning
Spanning --> Reinforcement --> Spanning

15.28

Total (%)

29.17

1.39

30.56

Buffering --> Reinforcement --> Spanning

8.33

1.39

9.72

Buffering --> Reinforcement --> Spanning -->
Reinforcement

1.39

-

1.39

Spanning --> Buffering --> Reinforcement

1.39

2.78

4.17

1.39

-

1.39

1.39

-

1.39

13.89

4.17

18.06

Spanning --> Reinforcement --> Buffering
Buffering,
Reinforcement & Spanning --> Reinforcement --> Buffering -->
Spanning
Spanning
Total (%)

15.28

1.39

1.39

Additional Themes
Through the coding exercise additional themes surfaced that should be mentioned.
Although this study found that autonomy shifts have been exhibited frequently in past
missions, making up 65% of our coded incidents, the relinquishing of autonomy by the
space crew was an additional theme that came up during the coding exercise. These
incidents involved the space crew having autonomy and then for one reason or another
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relinquishing the autonomy back to MCC. In some instances, the space crew was seen
claiming its own autonomy and attempting to manage the issues by themselves but once
they realized they would not be able to resolve the issue on their own they relinquished
autonomy and asked for help or guidance from MCC. Other times environmental factors
led to the space crew gaining autonomy, in these instances the space crew would either try
to manage the issue on their own or not try at all from the start, but in the end would always
wait until they could come back in contact with MCC to ask for help. We can see there is
an eagerness and confidence exhibited by the space crew in wanting autonomy from MCC,
but the relinquishing of autonomy leads us to believe that there are still more steps that
need to be taken to prepare the space crew to be successful when autonomous. Lastly, the
theme of the space crew relinquishing autonomy was only seen when the space crew
claimed its autonomy or received autonomy by environmental factors, it was not seen when
MCC granted autonomy to the space crew. Table 9 and 10 detail these themes.
Table 9. Additional themes identified in autonomy shifts triggered by crew claiming
CIs with Autonomy Shifts Total
(%)

Additional Themes
Space crew relinquishing autonomy

24

Weak reinforcement

12

Grand Total (%)

36

32

Table 10. Percentage of relinquishing autonomy critical incidents with outcomes
Autonomy Shift
Trigger Type

Successful (%)
6

Unsuccessful (%)
2

CIs with
Autonomy Shifts
(%)
8

Environmental Focus

14

2

16

Grand Total (%)

20

4

24

Crew Claiming

Relinquishing Autonomy

33

DISCUSSION
Overall, designing valid interventions for SFMTSs is inevitably challenging: our
knowledge of how SFMTSs optimally function is limited, and access to those familiar with
these environments is equally difficult. However, historiometric approaches enable us to
translate from our past, in order to be proactive and reactive for future SFMTS success.
This study seeks to continue to comprehensively and inductively identify specific SFMTS
contexts involving inter-team autonomy shifts and boundary work processes, focusing on
functional and dysfunctional outcomes.
Regarding trigger types for inter-team autonomy shifts, we saw that the majority
(65%) of the 100 critical incidents coded exhibited this shift. This is a good sign for future
missions that expect to have a greater number of autonomy shifts, as through our analysis
we can confirm that SFMTSs have already been dealing with them. Further, digging deeper
into this finding, we see that many of these autonomy shifts were triggered by the space
crew claiming its autonomy from Mission Control. Almost half (46%) of the critical
incidents exhibited an inter-team autonomy shift triggered by “crew claiming”. This is a
key takeaway as it suggests and further confirms the eagerness and confidence from space
crews within their team unit to take charge and be less reliant on MCC. This may also be a
good sign for future missions expecting a more autonomous space crew.
While “crew claiming” was a popular inter-team autonomy shift trigger, a pattern
witnessed within crew claiming emerged in the form of the relinquishing of autonomy by
the space crew. That is, shortly after the space crew claimed its autonomy, they
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relinquished it back to MCC. As we see that space crews desire to be more autonomous
from MCC, the next steps may be to ensure that they have the appropriate tools and training
in order to be successful when autonomous. In other words, how can we diminish this
theme of “relinquishing autonomy”? More research around this specific theme is needed,
but countermeasures can begin to be developed to mitigate this from happening on LDEMs.
Moreover, this study served in an exploratory manner to begin to identify themes
and patterns in team boundary work during autonomy shifts in SFMTSs. Lastly, two
additional themes (shown in Table 9) emerged from this study that were coded as the
relinquishing of autonomy by the space crew and the observation of a different type of
reinforcement which the coders identified as weak reinforcement. While this study shows
us interesting findings, there remains a great amount of work to be done to truly solidify
our understanding on team boundary work in SFMTSs.
Although future research is needed to further validate the current team boundary
work patterns and inter-team autonomy shift trigger types, the overall themes and content
created from this study have several practical implications for NASA. The team boundary
work patterns found indicate the types of functional boundary work for inter-team
autonomy shifts in complex spaceflight multiteam systems that occur most often and the
outcomes historically tied to them. From these patterns of descriptive behaviors
countermeasures and training can begin to be developed.
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Similarly, these patterns could be used to develop team performance and feedback
tools that reflect these important foci of functional team boundary work throughout interteam autonomy shifts in SFMTSs. As spaceflight multiteam contexts are complex,
informationally rich, and time-limited, the development of automated feedback tools will
gather and feed information back to teams regarding such team boundary work behaviors
as information flow within, between, and across teams in the system would be a particularly
valuable practical application.
Limitations
While this study contributes to theory on team boundary work, several limitations
need to be considered. First, the emphasis on context-rich cases, and inductive theorygenerative approach makes our findings highly specific to the context in which we are
interested (i.e., spaceflight multiteam systems), which comes at the expense of the inability
to fully generalize the findings to other multiteam systems. Thus, the types of teams studied
form boundary conditions for the results. It could be expected that the results presented
herein apply to extreme teams as defined by Bell, Brown, Colaneri, and Outland (2018):
those who (a) complete their tasks in performance environments with one or more
contextual features that are atypical in level (e.g., extreme time pressure) or kind (e.g.,
confinement, danger) and (b) for which ineffective performance has serious consequences.
That is, the findings may hold for astronauts, military personnel, wildland firefighters, or
other teams with high skill levels who operate in intense, dynamic contexts under the
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pressure of extreme consequences, often life or death. However, they may be most
applicable to extreme teams who are predominantly intact in their membership and where
members have a high level of task-based experience.
Another limitation of this study is that its sample of critical incidents considered
happened to be made up of overwhelmingly successful outcomes. Thus, as mentioned in
the results, our findings showed that most team boundary work witnessed when inter-team
autonomy shifts were triggered led to successful outcomes, but this may simply be due to
the number of critical incidents with successful outcomes in our sample. That is, many of
the documents used to develop incidents were focused upon near disasters and ways to
improve these systems. It could be possible that different processes may exist for incidents
with less successful outcomes.
Furthermore, the way in which a critical incident is structured can oftentimes affect
the way that it is coded. Specifically, when coding incidents, the length of critical incidents
is an interesting point to keep in mind. There were times when one critical incident could
have been broken into two unique critical incidents, thus possibly changing the outcome
that was coded as successful. This is an interesting matter to keep in mind for future similar
studies and may be a way to mitigate the issue of having an overly large sample size of
successful or unsuccessful critical incidents.
Lastly, while the proposed study intended to study inter-team autonomy shifts, the
findings suggest that what took place may best be referred to as changes in autonomy. It is
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important to point this out because inter-team autonomy shifts seem to refer more directly
to moments where autonomy is continuously changing. This was not the case in most of
our critical incidents. What was witnessed was moments when the crew became
autonomous or dependent on MCC. At most we saw shifts in the relinquishing of autonomy
by the space crew, but this was not a back and forth of autonomy levels. Thus, perhaps it
is needed to fully understand what we mean when we refer to inter-team autonomy shifts,
as thus far it is loosely defined. More work is needed in this area.
Implications and Future Directions
The aim of this study was to inductively generate aspects of team boundary work
and inter-team autonomy shift triggers important to spaceflight multiteam systems for long
duration exploration missions. While there is clearly some correspondence between the
theories used as basis points for this study and its findings, there are also unique notable
differences which represent fruitful targets for future empirical studies of team boundary
work within such contexts. Future research is needed that further explores these patterns
and autonomy shift triggers in SFMTSs.
Although the team boundary work patterns, and autonomy shift triggers provide an
interesting starting point for empirical work of team boundary work in MTSs, these
patterns and triggers need to be examined in terms of their effect on system level outcomes.
In other words, we need to further understand whether the identified patterns have a causal
outcome on the multiteam system or act as mediators.
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Further, the themes identified were derived using the critical incident method and
are descriptive of behaviors that could be used as the basis of team and boundary spanner
training for LDEMs. As NASA prepares for LDEMs, boundary spanner roles – those who
connect or span the boundaries between distinct teams and support the development of
team cognition – have been a topic of interest for SFMTSs (Anania et al., 2017). That is,
understanding the type of boundary work and processes can help to further identify
appropriate trainings for these roles. Additionally, this work aimed to identify autonomyshift trigger types focused on the space crew. It would be interesting to instead identify
specific individual roles that triggered these autonomy shifts and include those findings
into boundary spanner leadership training.
Conclusion
As focus on the importance of team and multi-team systems research continues, the
importance of team boundary work and inter-team autonomy shifts continues as well. This
study serves to begin to break apart the specifics of how shifting inter-team autonomy is
exhibited within teams (i.e., crew claiming, mission control granting) in space and what
team boundary work (i.e., buffering) looks like in SFMTSs. Though this study works
within a specific type of team (i.e. spaceflight teams) in a specific context (i.e. space), it
may well have implications for other types of extreme teams. Furthermore, this study may
serve as a springboard for further research to continue to investigate the specifics of these
processes as well as continue to examine them through other, varied methods.
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Appendix A
Crayne and Hunter’s (2018) Steps and Substeps for Historiometric Analysis
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Appendix B
Coded Critical Incident Example
Mission

Gemini 9

CI #

G9-4

CI
Narrative/
Summary

The astronaut conducting the EVA (Cernan) on the third day of the Mission
realized it would be unsafe for him to continue with his tasks. His heart rate was
increasing, he was sweating to the point that his visor was fogged up, and the
stiffness of his spacesuit limited his mobility. After contacting Mission Control, he
was told to take a break. However, he wanted to continue the EVA and began to
connect himself to the Applied Meteorology Unit. Another astronaut (Stafford)
ordered him to return to the shuttle. Stafford had to physically help Cernan back
into the spacecraft since Cernan was in physical pain from the space suit
pressure. Cernan attempted to remove a mirror from the side of the spacecraft,
which resulted in his visor becoming completely fogged up. He and Stafford
were able to re-pressurize the cabin, but the EVA was discontinued for the time
being. After this incident, the AMU was never used again on Gemini.

Outcome

Unsuccessful

Autonomy
Shift
Trigger
Type

Crew Claiming

Boundary
Work
Type(s)

Buffering, Spanning & Reinforcement

Order of
Boundary
Work

Spanning  Buffering  Reinforcement

Source(s)

Cernan, Eugene; Davis, & Donald A. (2013). "13" (Kindle)| The Last Man on the
Moon: Astronaut Eugene Cernan and America's Race in Space (Unabridged.
ed.). New York: St. Martin's Press. ISBN 9781429971782
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Appendix C
Codebook: Interteam Autonomy Shift Trigger Types
Inter-Team Autonomy Shift
Trigger Type

Crew Claiming

MCC Granting

Environmental Factors

No Shift

Definition
Space crew claims autonomy from MCC. Generally, the
behaviors witnessed will show a clear action where the space
crew is working alone within their own component team.
Autonomy is given to the space crew by MCC either by clear
direction from MCC to the space crew with orders to handle
the incident by themselves or through recommendations on
actions to take, leaving the space crew to make the final
decision.
Environmental factors outside of any component team’s
control (e.g., communication issues, orbital distances) cause
the autonomy shift.
No autonomy shift is witnessed during the critical incident.
Typically, will involve heavy spanning or sole reinforcement
boundary work.
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Appendix D
Codebook: Faraj and Yan (2009) Team Boundary Work Definitions
Team
Boundary
Work

Definitions by Faraj & Yan (2009)

Spanning

Strategy of engagement, in which a focal team undertakes actions to reach
out into its environment in order to acquire important resources and support.

Buffering

Strategy of disengagement, in which a team closes itself off from the
environment. Protects itself from external disturbances and uncertainties.

Reinforcement

A team internally sets and reclaims its boundaries by increasing member
awareness of boundaries and enhancing team identity.
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Appendix E
Codebook: Team Boundary Work Expanded Definitions
Team
Boundary

Reinforcement

Buffering

Spanning

Work

Definition by Faraj & Yan (2009)
Strategy of engagement, in which a
focal team undertakes actions to reach
out into its environment in order to
acquire important resources and
support.

Strategy of disengagement, in which a
team closes itself off from the
environment. Protects itself from
external disturbances and uncertainties.

A team internally sets and reclaims its
boundaries by increasing member
awareness of boundaries and
enhancing team identity.
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Expanded Definition

Space crew reaches out to MC (or
environment) for help, and/ or is
open enough to receive
information/help from MC.

Space crew chooses NOT to go to
MC for help/guidance/information.
NOT engaging in the first place.

Space crew works together to come
up with an idea or solution by
themselves, relying on internal
team members and their knowledge
to come up with a solution.
Additionally, performing their
expected duties without
engagement from MC.

Appendix F
Inter-team Autonomy Shift Trigger Type Examples
Autonomy Shift
Trigger Type

Crew Claiming

MCC Granting

Environmental
Factors

No Shift

Critical Incident Coded Example
The Skylab 4 astronauts were unhappy with the way the ground
control team micromanaged their work schedules. The crew
complained repeatedly that they were overworked and never allowed
to make their own decisions on when to do tasks. Halfway through
their 84-day mission, the crew told Houston not to bother calling; they
were taking the day off and would not answer the radio. The next day,
after serious discussions, Houston agreed to modify their approach.
Rather than detailed timelines with each minute scheduled,
crewmembers would receive a daily list of tasks to be accomplished,
which they could personally organize in the most effective sequence.
After five long days of being on the space shuttle mission control let
the space crew decide if they wanted to sleep in after completing the
first part of their mission. Before deciding what to do the space crew
reviewed a list of tasks, they had to do the following day to make sure
sleeping in was the appropriate option. After talking about it with all the
crew members they decided to let mission control know that they
would be sleeping in the next day.
During Apollo 16, the lunar module (LM) and command module (CM)
were separated with two and one astronauts in each, respectively.
Suddenly, the CM begins shaking with a gimbal oscillating out of
control. None of the astronauts can contact Mission Control (MC) as
their orbit location prevents contact. The CM astronaut asks the LM
astronauts for suggestions, but they have none, and revert to the flight
rules. Unable to gain proper operation of the CM, the astronauts
decide to rendezvous the LM and CM. The astronauts aboard the two
separate ships begin communicating their location, and start
referencing stars to help guide each other until they can rendezvous
and finally gain control of the CM.
As the space crew was completing the five tests that needed to be
done before re-entry the crew noticed they didn't know how to fully
complete the final test. The space crew asked mission control on how
to navigate the final test that needed to be done before re-entry.
Mission control informed them that they would need to go
counterclockwise on their switch back around when completing final
test. Then when finished with that they would need to go onto the next
non exit skip pattern. The space crew followed the instructions from
mission control and the outcome of this critical incident was a success.
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Appendix G
Team Boundary Work Expanded Definitions Example
Team Boundary

Critical Incident Coded Example

Reinforcement

Buffering

Spanning

Work
The space crew had just completed tracking landmarks when mission
control contacted them about the fuel cells for the flight back home.
Mission control (MC) had constructed a new fuel cell plan where they were
going to leave it offline in an open circuit. They wanted the space crew to
turn the fuel cell in-line heaters off and monitor the temperature. MC told
the space crew they had to make sure the temperature stayed between
390 and 410. This would allow them to go as long as 50 hours without
purging. MC acted created this solution for the space crew to use the fuel
more wisely to get back home, which resulted in a positive outcome.
The space crew members identified that they were having a serious
problem with waste escaping the waste compartment. First, they thought
that the waste compartment was full, and this was causing the waste to
overflow, however they realized this was not the issue, rather that the
suction was not working properly and waste was simply floating to the top
and flowing out. The crew decided they would have to stick their hand
deep into the waste compartment to ensure that they’re waste would not
come up. A crew member was either chosen as the unlucky individual to
have to do this or an individual volunteered, it is unclear how the individual
was chosen. However, the space crew did not attempt to reach mission
control for help with this issue. Pushing the waste deep into the waste
compartment fixed the issue.
As the space crew was traveling, they realized something was wrong with
the heater. According to procedures, the space crew should communicate
this to mission control but were unable to because their location in space
did not permit them to communicate with mission control. One of the space
crew members asked why they didn’t tell mission control earlier when they
were in contact with them, but other members mentioned that the heater
light had not come on until after they had lost communication with mission
control. The space crew began to attempt to fix the heater themselves.
They thought it was an exhaust temperature issue but also thought it could
be the pump package. They went through all the circuit breaker buttons
but could not fix the heater. The space crew decided to wait until they got
back in contact with mission control to fix the heater with their help. It is
unclear from the transcripts if the space crew were able to fix the heater in
the end with mission control's help, but they were unable to fix it
themselves.
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